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European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989

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irrelevant, and that the costs of war have become prohibitive, Nixon notes that "economic power contributes only indirectly to a nation's security by generating wealth to channel toward that end." It is no small irony that similar ideas about the diminishing utility of armed force and the likelihood of its use were prevalent in the years before 1914.

The last myth is the "decline of America." Nixon points out that America today dominates militarily, has the strongest scientific and technological base, ranks near the top in per capita income, and has the same twenty-five-percent share of the world GNP that it had before the anomalous post–World War II period. "The United Stares stands at the apex of its geopolitical power. If its status as the world's only superpower erodes, that will result from choice, not necessity."

In succeeding chapters, Nixon offers specific policy recommendations for dealing with the former Soviet Union, Europe, East Asia and the Pacific, the Muslim world, and the Southern Hemisphere. The concluding chapter, "The Renewal of America," discusses problems at home that bear on America in the world, from renascent isolationism to economic and educational weakness, to the decline of values manifested in serious problems of racism, drugs, and crime.

This is a most worthwhile and stimulating book. In contrast to the ephemeral "New World Order," it presents cogent arguments for a coherent world view. Even more important in a time of excessive pessimism about America's condition, Nixon offers a hopeful assessment of U.S. potential to influence the world for good in the coming years. In the author's words, "Just as the free world turned to America for leadership to confront the post–World War II Soviet threat, the world as a whole will look to America for leadership to grapple with the post–Cold War problems. For most of the world's people, the twentieth century has been a century of war, repression, and poverty. For the first time in history, there is a real chance to make the next century a century of peace, freedom, and progress. Today, only one nation can provide the leadership to achieve those goals. The United States is privileged to be that nation. Our moment of truth has arrived. We must seize the moment."

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Simon, Jeffrey, ed. *European Security Policy after the Revolutions of 1989.* Washington: National Defense Univ. Press, 1991. 640pp. (No price given)

This book is a compendium of essays resulting from a conference on "Force Mobilization, the Revolutions of 1989, and European Security" hosted by the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in June 1990. It is intended as a companion piece to *NATO–Warsaw Pact Force*

Mobilization, by the same author and editor, published in 1988.

The essays were written by twenty-two luminaries on Euro-Nato security topics, and though the book is uneven in its coverage, it generally follows a country-by-country format: recent political changes, perceived security threats, and likely force arrays. It is organized into five sections: implications for Nato and Warsaw Pact, German unification and Nato's core nations, Europe's peripheral nations, problems on Europe's flanks, and challenges to Nato's southern (Mediterranean) region.

The book's limitations are twofold—its timeliness and its thematic organization. The events that took place in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union in mid-1991 alone render some of this material outdated. Also, the twenty-two "main menu" pieces have that scissors-and-paste look often seen in the first-generation guerrilla warfare books of the late 1960s. This could have been avoided with tighter editing, a few demands upon the contributors for comparable conclusions, inclusion of some maps, and the addition of a complete bibliography. Yet Simon was brave even to attempt this volume, given the problem of perishable material, and it does cover many things not seen in previous unclassified literature.

The essay by U.S. Army Colonel Karl H. Lowe, "U.S. Armed Forces in the New Europe," is a classic that can stand on its own. It belongs on the desks of legislators and executives in Washington. Lowe states that the "message NATO must convey to the Soviets and their peoples is that the surest guarantee of European stability is to preserve strategic balance and mutual transparency of military activity. . . . It is infinitely wiser to evolve our force (U.S.A.) structures to a security framework supportive of future needs than to simply devolve from what exists without heeding the pitfalls lying in wait." Also, the two essays on the former East and West Germanys, by Joseph S. Gordon and Stephen F. Szabo respectively, are worth whatever the book costs.

This book will not win literary awards for smooth reading, but it is a classic in its time for collateral reasons. During all the years of the Cold War, from 1947 to 1989, did anyone really have a one-volume rationale for all the military forces in the Euro-Nato region? In this book, one can find out what Spain defines as its African security threat, and how that perception influences Nato; the role of the Rumanian army in the 1989 coup d'état, and its probable future behavior; the French order of battle in a mixed-force array; and the Soviet views on war mobilization in a fast-changing political milieu.

Any government or corporate executive who deals with Euro-Nato issues should have this book within easy desk-top reach. For the military professional, the question may well be why such a book did not exist when Nato and Warsaw Pact were clearly defined mortal enemies. This volume should be recommended reading for any college course on twentieth-

century Europe, be it history, political science, or economics. It will open vistas previously unavailable to civilian scholars.

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Hattendorf, John B. and Murfett, Malcolm H., eds. *The Limitations of Military Power: Essays Presented to Professor Norman Gibbs on his Eightieth Birthday*. London: Macmillan, and New York: St. Martins, 1990. 242pp. (No price given)

Professor Norman Gibbs was the Chichele Professor of the History of War at Oxford University from 1953 to 1977. Well known as a visiting lecturer at the Naval War College in the 1960s and 1970s and as a contributor to this journal, Gibbs was also visiting professor at several other American institutions, including Princeton, The Mershon Center at Ohio State, New Brunswick, and West Point. In addition, at Oxford he taught and served as *doctor vater* to a number of past and present War College faculty members.

Gibbs received the page proofs of the *festschrift* on his eightieth birthday but died before the book appeared in print. In it, a number of his friends and former students have combined an interesting collection of essays, using the theme of Gibbs's own interest in the Clausewitzian ideas of friction and the inherent limitations of military power.

In his foreword to the volume, General Andrew Goodpaster relates Gibbs's success as a teacher at West Point, while British diplomat Sir Michael Pike tells of his own experience as an undergraduate in Gibbs's classes, and military historian Piers Mackesy discusses his close association with Gibbs as a colleague. The remainder of the book is divided into three sections. The first essay outlines the way in which war studies developed over the past century at Oxford University, showing Gibbs's role along with those of his predecessors, Spencer Wilkinson and Cyril Falls, and his successors, Sir Michael Howard and Robert O'Neill.

In the second part of the book, four authors suggest some themes, beyond Clausewitz's view of moral and psychological factors, that limit military power. Robert O'Neill illustrates the limitations of alliances and international order. George Tanham discusses the military problems involved in dealing with an elusive enemy in unconventional warfare, and Robert Jordan discusses the ways in which international organizations restrain military power. Concluding the section is Colin Gray's important article, which draws attention to the way in which geography limits grand strategy.

In the third part, five authors illuminate, in terms of historical case studies, the restraints on military power. Charles Townshend considers the role of a commander's personality in dealing with civil disturbances. George Peden discusses financial and